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DEBATE FORUM 
 
TARGETED KILLING AS A MEANS OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE: 
A PROVOCATIVE VIEW AND INVITATION TO DEBATE 
Sascha– Dominik Bachmann  
Ulf Haeussler 
 
The killing of Mahmoud al-Mabhou reportedly by agents of Israel‟s Mossad service in Dubai 
a year ago1 serves as a quick reminder that extrajudicial executions, assassinations and 
other targeted killing operations are taking place and are part of a modern democracy‟s 
arsenal of antiterrorism and counter-terrorism means. Targeted Killing Operations reportedly 
form part of NATO‟s operational practice: depending on the circumstances they represent 
just another option of the lawful use of force in an armed conflict or assimilated situations. 
Consequently, it is argued that International Law does not impose an explicit ban on the 
lethal neutralization of certain persons in an armed conflict scenario. This opinion provides a 
provocative view on possible justifications using targeted killing as an actual means of 
present day security operations – which must not be confused with traditional methods of 
domestic „policing‟ in a democratic state.  
 
“In recent years, a few States have adopted policies that permit the use of targeted killings, 
including in the territories of other States. Such policies are often justified as a necessary 
and legitimate response to „terrorism‟ and „”asymmetric warfare”‟, but have had the very 
problematic effect of blurring and expanding the boundaries of the applicable legal 
frameworks....‟2 
 
                                                     
 Senior Lecturer in Law (University of Portsmouth); Assessor Jur, LL.M, LL.D; Sascha-Dominik took 
part as an officer in peacekeeping missions in operational and advisory roles as part of NATO/KFOR 
from 2002 to 2006.  
 At the time of writing, Assistant Legal Advisor Operational Law, NATO, Headquarters Supreme 
Allied Commander Transformation (NATO HQ SACT), Norfolk/Va., USA. Nothing herein represents 
an official view of NATO or HQ SACT. 
1
 BBC News, „Hamas military commander “assassinated in Dubai'", 29 January 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8486531.stm. 
2
 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, 
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, Summary. The term of asymmetric warfare refers to unconventional warfare 
where the military capabilities of the combatants differ significantly. 
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Lawful, legitimate, morally justifiable – or just criminal and reprehensible? Can military and/or 
intelligence services lawfully use lethal force against specifically selected target persons – 
aka „high value targets‟ („HVTs‟)?3 Can such „targeted killing‟ ever be permissible under 
international law, either as proportionate military action or as a means of law enforcement 
without taking evidence and judgment?  This question, pointedly asked by Professor Alston 
in his most recent study on targeted killings, submitted as part of his report to the Human 
Rights Council,4 implies an answer in the negative – but rightly so? 
 
What is the position under International Law? Generally, States and International 
Organisations have a right to do whatever is not explicitly prohibited – in this case by the 
principles and rules of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) or relevant International Human 
Rights Law. 5 
 
Targeted killings occur in armed conflicts and international military operations mandated 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,6 and in military hostage release operations. Targeted 
killings may also be part of counter terrorism  operations, namely if the individuals labelled 
as „terrorists‟ are fighters of a non– governmental party to an armed conflict – by some also 
referred to as „unlawful combatants‟ – and as such have lost their protection as civilians 
under the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Additional Protocols (where applicable).7 As 
illustrated by relevant domestic jurisprudence, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) conducts 
targeted killing operations more or less openly;8 in addition, Israel's secret service, Mossad, 
reportedly does the same.9 The British reader is reminded of the McCann case of 1988 
where three suspected Irish Republican Army terrorists were killed by UK Special Air Service 
operatives10 during an operation which was considered to have a „policing‟ nature. 
Subsequently, questions about the legality of such „targeted killings‟ resurfaced again in 
                                                     
3
  A HVT is a target which is deemed important for the military/ political command for the successful 
accomplishment of a particular mission, such as a high ranking Taliban commander in a particular 
area of responsibility (AOR). 
4
 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. 
5
 This opinion piece takes an international law perspective and hence does not address whether, and 
if so, what limits States may have to respect in applying methods of warfare which are not prohibited 
by international law. 
6
 Articles 39 to 51 of chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations lay down possible „action with 
respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression‟. 
7
 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949). 
8
 Judgment HCJ 769/02, 11 December 2005. 
9 
BBC
 
News, „Israel's 'targeted killings,' 17 April 2004. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3556809.stm H. Tomlinson and S. Frenkel, „Mossad 
assassination squad used British passports,‟ The Times 16 February 2010. 
10
 McCann and Others v United Kingdom (1996) 21 EHRR 97.  For a discussion see e.g. John 
Andrews, ‘Right to life in Gibraltar,‟ 1996 21(4) European Law Review 333-336. 
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2009 in the context of the shooting of de Menezes.11 Further reports also mentioned the use 
of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) by the US to target Taliban and al–Qaeda operatives in 
the tribal area of Pakistan, and to target al– Qaeda operatives in Yemen. One author has 
expressed criticism and labeled this practice as an „extra– judicial execution‟.12 Whilst this 
label is inappropriate for targeted killings occurring in armed conflict and legally equivalent 
situations, it aptly captures cases in which totalitarian regimes have used this method to 
eliminate members of the opposition, e.g. by death squads. „Extrajudicial executions‟ in the 
latter sense violate the right to life and to due process of law,13 provided it amounts to: 
 
…an unlawful and deliberate killing carried out by order of a government or with its 
acquiescence…which can reasonably be assumed to be the result of a policy at any 
level of government to eliminate specific individuals as an alternative to arresting 
them and bringing them to justice.14   
 
This being said, the UN Special Rapporteur charged with investigating such cases 
nevertheless misperceives his or her mandate when he or she analyses the practice of 
legitimate international military operations under the same paradigm. There is a huge 
difference between targeted killings as a surrogate for law enforcement and targeted killings 
as a method of warfare.  Whilst the former are a matter of „policing‟ (law enforcement), the 
latter are acts of war. Without prejudice to any other relevant considerations, this difference 
activates the delineation between international human rights law and the law of armed 
conflict – which, according to the International Court of Justice, are in a relationship of lex 
generalis (human rights) and lex specialis (Law of Armed Conflict).15 Accordingly, targeted 
killings occurring in armed conflict come within the ambit of the law of armed conflict and 
must hence be assessed solely in light of this legal domain's principles and rules. 
 
The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) prohibits general and non– discriminate attacks on 
civilian non– combatants and the acceptance of excessive collateral damage. Such attacks 
                                                     
11
 See for example, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london_blasts/tube_shooting/html/ 
12
 See for example, David Kretzmer, ‘Targeted killing of suspected terrorists: extra-judicial executions 
or legitimate means of defence?’ 2005 16(2) European Journal of International Law 171-212. 
13
 Most notably constituting violations of Article 6 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights (1966) and its Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty (1990), Article 2 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR), whereas „Everyone‟s right to life shall be protected by law. No-one shall be 
deprived of his life intentionally,‟ which is reiterated in Protocol No. 6 to the 1950 European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
14
 Amnesty International, Israel Must End its Policy of Assassination (Amnesty International: London, 
July 2003) and Kretzmer, ‘Targeted killing of suspected terrorists‟ 
15
 Legal Consequences of  the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, 136 
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or effects may violate, as the case may be, one or more of the fundamental LOAC principles, 
that is, the principles of military necessity, distinction and proportionality.16 To prevent such 
violations, armed forces have developed a complex targeting process. This process, in 
particular steps „target development‟ and „assessment‟ therein17 applied by many armed 
forces aims – among other ends – to ensure that these humanitarian limitations to the use of 
force are observed.18 However, the designation of a person as a target is not based on 
procedures similar to police or prosecutorial investigation; the presumption of innocence 
which directs the administration of criminal justice is hence inept in this context. Rather, the 
aim of targeting individual persons is to reach a decision – based on comprehensive legal 
advice – taken by the responsible military commander as to how the opposing party to the 
conflict shall be weakened temporarily or (preferably) constantly. U.S. intelligence sources 
have observed, by the way, that the effectiveness of targeted killings is causing the Taliban 
and Al Qaida problems in recruiting new personnel for certain leadership positions.19 
 
Intelligence collection, analysis and target reconnaissance provide the required information – 
both for the planning and execution of a given operation. New information, specifically if 
additional significant collateral damage must be anticipated, may cause an operation to be 
cancelled or suspended on grounds violations of distinction and/or proportionality.20 Upon 
completion of an operation, in a post operational assessment both the military advantage 
achieved and compliance with standards of International Law are assessed; in case of non– 
compliance this will also involve the question of whether a formal investigation leading to 
appropriate legal consequences is required. To mention but one example, the International 
                                                     
16
 See also Common Article 3 Geneva Conventions, the German Military manuals on Law of Armed 
Conflict ZDV 15/1–15/3 (Zentrale Dienstvorschriften (ZDVs), Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten 
Konflikten, the Lieber Code as well as the US‟ Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations, at http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/wars/a/loac.htm. 
17
Target development referring to the process of providing timely and accurate locations of the 
enemy, „assessment‟ refers to the assessment of target viz.  damage: both steps ensure that the 
accurate provision of direct targeting data is ensured and in line of the principles of IHL. 
18
 For an overview, see Michael N Schmitt, „Targeted Killings in International Law: Law Enforcement, 
Self-Defense and Armed Conflict,‟ in R. Arnold, and N. Quenivet, (eds.) International Humanitarian 
Law and Human Rights Law: Towards a New Merger in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff: Leiden, 
Boston, 2008) 525-54 
19
 While the overall strength of the Taleban seems to be on the rise or at least stable, see e.g. 
„Taliban strength on rise in south‟, report, at 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2010/0719/1224275018281.html 
20 
 As the international principles on the proportionality of the jus ad bellum as a means of interstate 
relations as stipulated under Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter and of the choice of weapons and 
military tactics under the limitations and constraints of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, see note 
13 supra. 
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Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) employs specific procedures to review the existence 
of any (potential and actual) civilian casualties.21 
 
From the perspective of those who share the view that targeted killings are permissible 
whenever the Law of Armed Conflict applies to an operation, the questions raised above 
may at best relate to details of operational planning and execution. The present discussion 
among the stakeholders of International Law, however, shows disagreement that goes 
beyond such pure military details. Concerns exist particularly about the targeted killing of 
civilians taking a direct part in hostilities. The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC)'s Interpretive Guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities under IHL of 
May 200922 should have removed any remaining doubt as to whether any civilian exercising 
„a continuous combat function‟ and having lost temporary protection of the law of Geneva23 
may be targeted lethally at any time. However, according to some stakeholders the detention 
of such persons should be the choice preferred over a targeted killing – provided this is 
possible without major risks for the forces involved.24 The ICRC member responsible for the 
Interpretive Guidance has stated the same position in his doctoral thesis and, among others, 
corroborated his view by asserting that related legal statements made by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions transformed this interpretation 
into peremptory International Law (jus cogens).25 
 
                                                     
21
 See, e.g. „ISAF looks into civilian casualties in Kunar province,‟ ISAF News Release 2010-11-S-
241-2885 at www.nato.int/isaf. 
22
 Retrievable at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0990.htm 
23
 Ibid, 70, essentially reiterating Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, whereas „persons 
taking no active part in the hostilities‟ shall be treated humanely and may not be lawfully killed. 
24
 Ibid, 78, as „restraints on the use of force in direct attack‟.  
25
 Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law, OUP, (2008), passim. It would exceed the scope 
of this opinion piece to summarize the complex line of argument by which Melzer has first discovered 
that the Geneva Conventions and Protocols protect the right to life of civilians who take a direct part in 
hostilities in more or less the same way as by international human rights law, the relevant source 
essentially being the European Convention on Human Rights (which contains the highest standards 
of all human rights instruments Melzer has reviewed), that this protection has the nature of jus cogens 
although many States are not parties to any international human rights treaty, and that this jus cogens 
nature derives, inter alia and in particular, from the findings of the Special Rapporteur for extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions.  Moreover, Melzer also reads a presumption of civilian protection 
into GP I where this protocol only knows a presumption of civilian status (Article 50(1) of GP I – 
compare the silence of Article 51 of GP I).  Suffice it to say that Melzer offer's a position which may or 
may not deserve support de lege ferenda but which has no support de lege lata except when based 
on very interesting and unorthodox methods of legal reasoning.  In a time and age where interesting 
and unorthodox legal reasoning, when applied by governments, has triggered significant criticism, this 
may be considered regrettable. 
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This unorthodox position shows how human rights– based arguments might change the Law 
of Armed Conflict by means of a re– interpretation – provided though that the States and 
International Organisations involved in international military operations were to accept this 
without objection.  
 
However, the ongoing public discussion about targeted killings, which has gathered 
momentum since the leakage of various US and ISAF documents by WikiLeaks, may 
challenge the view that there is sufficient policy consensus or even common legal opinion 
(opinio juris) on the legality and practicability of targeted killings. However, the long standing 
practice of States and International Organizations – which involves decision– making within 
NATO and the UN Security Council, but also by way of involving the host states of such 
international military cooperation in the execution of targeted killings – as well as the ISAF 
Commander‟s new Counterinsurgency Guidance continue to highlight that targeted killings 
are still a method of warfare – even though they may not enjoy full universal acceptance.26  
 
Both NATO and the United Nations allow States contributing troops to international military 
operations the freedom of decision on whether to permit or not the possibility of targeted 
killing as part of their operational repertoire. This allows them to take into account national 
legal considerations when drafting their national rules of engagement (ROEs). There is a 
limitation to this freedom though: by acceding to International Organizations like NATO, 
states accept the organisation‟s role in determining, furthering or developing International 
Law – including a (not necessarily express) mandate for outlining a legal framework for 
targeted killings in military operations. This legal consequence may not be to the liking of 
some continental states: the reluctance of the German government and its electorate to 
come to terms with the fact that a war is being fought in Afghanistan serves as such an 
example.27 Consequently, NATO‟s authorization –  which may be considered to form part of 
the general rules of International Law –  to kill opposing fighters, including civilians directly 
participating in hostilities, in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict, and provided no 
excessive collateral damage is anticipated, takes precedence over opposing domestic law. 
The German constitution –  the Basic Law –  does not only allow Germany's membership in 
NATO or the UN in their capacity as mutual collective defence systems, but it also ensures 
that their respective LOAC practice can and will be respected at the domestic level. Lawful 
and legitimate? Under contemporary International Law the answer is clearly in the 
                                                     
26
 See http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf 
27
  See „Germany Comes to Terms With Its New War,‟ The Times, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1978800,00.html 
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affirmative. Nevertheless, there should no doubt that in answering the question of whether 
targeted killings are morally justified or reprehensible all actors involved, at the political level 
and within the armed forces, must also duly consult their conscience. 
